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Does it really matter if preferences are not rigorously assessed in
trials?
I
t is well established that random
assignment between experimental
treatment and control arms is the
gold standard in clinical trials to mini-
mise differences between the groups
being compared and safeguard against
bias. There is, however, a fear that such
random allocation may not accord with
patients’ preferences for the interven-
tion or treatment, thereby compromis-
ing trial validity. It is possible that
patients may resent not receiving their
treatment of choice, and their negative
attitude may lead to non-adherence to
treatment or affect outcomes in some
other way. Consequently, one option for
trial designers is to include patient
preference arms, whereby patients with
no treatment preference are randomly
allocated to experimental and control
arms, while patients expressing a treat-
ment preference are allocated to receive
their preferred treatment.1
Most of the debate about preference
arms has focused on issues concerning
increases in the sample size required,
the types and stages of randomised
design, and how to compare the groups.
Ethical issues also arise, leading to
concerns about those with strong treat-
ment preferences being included in
studies in the first place, especially those
in which randomisation takes place
irrespective of patients’ elicited prefer-
ences (that is, to measure whether those
who received their preferred treatment,
or not, differed from the no preference
groups). There is less information about
how doctors’ preferences for treatment
influence their patients’ preferences.2
A recent systematic review of the
impact of patient and doctor preference
for intervention in randomised trials,
across a range of disorders, reported that
elicitation of preferences led to a sub-
stantial proportion of potential partici-
pants (patients, including parents, and
doctors) refusing randomisation. How-
ever, differences in outcome across the
trials between randomised and prefer-
ence groups were reported to be small,
and where preference effects were noted
these were generally inconsistent.3 The
authors of this study concluded that there
was little evidence that preference sub-
stantially interfered with the internal or
external validity of trials. The review
included studies according to methodo-
logical criteria and if they ‘‘measured or
recorded patient or physician preference’’
(page 1090). However, the reviewed
studies varied widely in their approach
to eliciting preferences, and preferences
often appeared to have been simply noted
in the consent to randomise procedures
used. The methods used in most research
on preferences include single item ques-
tions asking patients to state the option
they would choose, Likert scales of the
strength of the stated preference, and
utility measurements (for example, rat-
ing scales, time trade offs, standard
gamble methods)2; less commonly, pre-
ferences have been explored using dis-
crete choice analysis.4 The question
arises: does it really matter if preferences
are not rigorously assessed in trials?
DO PREFERENCE ARMS REALLY
REPRESENT PATIENTS’
PREFERENCES?
It matters if preferences are not rigor-
ously assessed because of the review’s
finding that there was little evidence
that preference substantially interfered
with trial validity. While this may be a
valid conclusion, the result could also be
simply attributable to each preference
arm containing bias or a random mix of
genuine preferences. Arguably, a pre-
ference can only be ‘‘true’’ if based on
full, clear, and unbiased information
about the treatment options: a prefer-
ence is a value for alternative options for
action after informed deliberation of
their risks and benefits. And preferences
need rigorous, standardised elicitation:
research has shown that preferences are
complex phenomena that may be
informed by a wide range of constructs.
That is, patients may have different
reasons for expressing similar prefer-
ences—reasons based on past, or close
others’ experiences; on misunderstand-
ings of the different treatments; or on a
plethora of other factors that range from
justified fear to considered practicality.5
Patients can be affected differently by
the same situation,6 and attach different
significance to the same processes and
outcomes,7 resulting in different treat-
ment preferences. Additionally, when
confronted with one or more unfamiliar
treatments and asked to state a pre-
ference, a patient’s immediate answer
might not survive further reflection, or
indeed, first contact with the treatment
itself. Furthermore, we must be cautious
in interpreting preference studies even
when these do provide patients with
apparently full descriptions of treatment
options. It is well known that patients’
and doctors’ preferences for treatment
can be influenced by ‘‘framing’’ effects
(the presentation of information in
different ways, negatively or positively,
and in a different order), understand-
ings of the concept of risk (relative or
absolute risks); verbal (‘‘rarely’’, ‘‘some-
times’’, ‘‘never’’) or numeric (single
figures, decimals, fractions, or percen-
tages) descriptions of risks and bene-
fits.7 Other influences might include
recall bias in relation to the information
on risks and benefits received; varying
expectations; preference for the status
quo or familiar scenarios; and, in the
case of patients, by their doctor’s pre-
ferences, perhaps because of patients’
deference to doctors’ dominance in the
decision making process and the incli-
nation of a substantial minority, espe-
cially older patients, to leave the
decision ‘‘to the doctor’’8 (despite the
fact that doctors’ and patients’ treat-
ment preferences, when measured in a
standardised way, have been shown to
vary).2 All this can mean that the
relation between stated and actual ‘‘true’’
preferences is weak. Surprisingly, there is
little research examining the relation
between patients’ anticipated preferences
for treatment, actual behaviour (treat-
ment), and post-treatment preferences.9
Given these potential influences, then, it
is not unexpected that the conclusion of
one systematic review was that, while
provision of information on risk reduced
decisional conflicts and stimulated
patients to be more active in treatment
decisions, the effect on the outcome of
these decisions (actual treatment) was
uncertain.10
In view of all this potential ‘‘noise’’ in
preference elicitation, it might be consid-
ered as surprising if there was evidence
that preferences, as currently measured,
substantially interfered with trial validity.
The possibility that preference arms in
trials may not reflect true, informed,
rigorously assessed preferences means
that the results of analyses of the effects
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of preferences on outcome are ambi-
guous. Asking a person if they prefer ‘‘tea
or coffee’’ may result in a valid choice,
given that such preferences are likely to be
genuinely informed by familiarity with,
and experience of, the two options. But in
the case of treatment preferences, initially
low patient knowledge of the processes,
risksandbenefitsof the treatmentoptions,
means that such simplistic methods of
questioning, which do not even consider
the reasons underlying preferences, may
be inappropriate for this complex topic.
The conclusion can only be that the results
of analyses of preference arms in trials
must be viewed with caution, and the
elicitation of preferences deserves more
respect, with the application of better
methodology to match the rigour of other
aspects of trial design. If each preference
arm in clinical trials does simply contain a
random mix of genuine preferences, then
this not only has implications for the
rigour of research methodology, but also
for the soundness of health policy on
which such research is based.
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Speaker’s corner..............................................................................
A fascinating doctoral thesis
I
n early March 2004 I had the opportunity of travelling to
Trondheim. Although not exactly paradise, this Norwegian
city is interesting because it has the most northerly
cathedral of Europe. It was built in the 12th century in the
Romanesque style, and has been carefully preserved through
the ages. The city was still partly covered by snow, but this
was rapidly melting in a heavy rain. To find shelter I strolled
into the cathedral bookstore, where I discovered a most
fascinating doctoral thesis.
We all know that one can write doctoral theses about any
subject, but this student had really found an extraordinary
topic. He had written his thesis about weathering effects on
the stone surface of Trondheim cathedral—a detailed study
of how wind, precipitation, and frost have left their traces on
this church. Pictures of roofs, windows, and walls showed the
destructive influences of the hostile environment in which
this church has been built. It was only through regular,
careful repair that the building had survived, and this thesis
was an attempt to contribute to protecting the building
against future attacks on its integrity by proposing a few
improvements of the design of its surface.1 Quite clearly, its
author had come to love this building dearly. It was difficult
to escape the impression that the author had seen this
cathedral as a living being—a grandmother whose hair, face,
and skin have suffered from the wear and tear of time.
Browsing through this remarkable book I realised that this
image of a building surviving in a hostile environment is
actually a nice metaphor for human aging. Aging is a matter
of accumulating damage to the body, plus a terrible design
failure. It is a matter of being exposed to the wear and tear of
time, plus a lack of sufficient repair mechanisms. The latter is
evident from the fact that there are examples of species that
do not show signs of aging. The oldest living organism in the
world is a bristlecone pine (Pinus longaeva) nicknamed
‘Methuselah’. He is 4770 years old and lives at high altitudes
in a dry area in the White Mountains, east California (USA).
Unlike human beings, bristlecone pines show no inherent
signs of senescence, and even the oldest among these
remarkable trees continue to produce cones with viable
seeds.2 Longevity in trees is achieved by characteristics such
as retention of stem cells after each growth cycle, ability to
replace complete damaged organs, a sectored vascular system
that permits part of a tree to survive when the whole cannot,
formation of clones, and other biological mechanisms that
human beings must do without.3
Can we live longer? Evolution has endowed us with
biological systems that were intended to last for 40, 60,
perhaps 80 years, and revolutionary advances in life
expectancy are probably dependent on engineering these
biological systems. Perhaps, if we unravel the secrets of
bristlecone pines and other long lived organisms, we can
bypass evolution and develop interventions that increase
average human life expectancy at birth to 100, 120, perhaps
200 years. If we would prevent the death rate to rise after the
age of adolescence, by radically improving our environment
and drastically improving our design, life expectancy would
increase to 1200 years,4 a value approximating that of
bristlecone pines and Trondheim cathedral. The ‘‘only’’
remaining question is whether we would actually enjoy it …
Johan P Mackenbach
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